Deterministic approximation of stochastic evolution in games

Econometrica

Volumn 71, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 873-903

  Benaïm, Michel ^a   Weibull, Jörgen W ^b  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE CERGY PONTOISE   (France)

^b Boston University   (United States)

Author keywords

Approximation; Evolution; Game theory; Large deviations; Markov chains

Indexed keywords

APPROXIMATION THEORY; DIFFERENCE EQUATIONS; GAME THEORY; MARKOV PROCESSES; ORDINARY DIFFERENTIAL EQUATIONS;

DETERMINISTIC FLOW; NASH EQUILIBRIUM;

RANDOM PROCESSES;

EID: 0037603583     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0262.00429     Document Type: Article

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