Non-Nash equilibria of Darwinian dynamics with applications to duopoly

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 19, Issue 3-4, 2001, Pages 415-453

  Rhode, Paul ^a   Stegeman, Mark ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA   (United States)

^b VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE AND STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

C73; D43; Duopoly; Evolution; Imitation; L21; Relative payoffs; Revenue maximization

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035545367     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-7187(99)00025-9     Document Type: Article

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