Stochastic replicator dynamics

International Economic Review

Volumn 41, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 451-481

  Cabrales, Antonio ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040185726     PISSN: 00206598     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-2354.00071     Document Type: Article

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