Erratum: Going, going, gone! A swift tour of auction theory and its applications (De Economist) (2006) vol. 154 (197-249) 10.1007/s10645-006-9002-5);Going, going, gone! A swift tour of auction theory and its applications

Economist

Volumn 154, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 197-249

  Maasland, Emiel ^a   Onderstal, Sander ^b  

^a ERASMUS UNIVERSITY ROTTERDAM   (Netherlands)

^b UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Auctioning incentive contracts; Efficiency; Equilibrium bidding; Multiple objects; Optimal auctions; Revenue equivalence

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC THEORY; INCENTIVE; OPTIMIZATION;

EID: 33746273285     PISSN: 0013063X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10645-006-9025-y     Document Type: Erratum

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