The all-pay auction with complete information

Economic Theory

Volumn 8, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 291-305

  Baye, Michael R ^a   Kovenock, Dan ^b   De Vries, Casper G ^c  

^a PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b PURDUE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c TINBERGEN INSTITUTE   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030305641     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF01211819     Document Type: Article

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