Using first-price auctions to sell heterogeneous licenses

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 24, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 555-581

  Goeree, Jacob K ^a   Offerman, Theo ^b   Schram, Arthur ^b  

^a CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Entry; Experiments; Multiple unit auctions; Winner's curse

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL EFFECTS; EXPERIMENTS; INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS; PUBLIC POLICY;

ENTRY; MULTIPLE-UNIT AUCTIONS; WINNER'S CURSE;

INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT;

EID: 33644781696     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2005.07.011     Document Type: Article

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