Multi-Unit Pay-Your-Bid Auctions with Variable Awards

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 23, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 25-42

  Engelbrecht Wiggans, Richard ^a   Kahn, Charles M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0002003002     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1997.0599     Document Type: Article

References (15)

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