Bidding for Labor

Review of Economic Dynamics

Volumn 3, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 619-649

  Julien, Benoît ^a   Kennes, John ^b   King, Ian ^c,d  

^a VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON   (New Zealand)

^b PACE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF VICTORIA   (Canada)

^d UNIVERSITY OF AUCKLAND   (New Zealand)

Author keywords

Matching; wage dispersion; auctions; unemployment; efficiency

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034288210     PISSN: 10942025     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/redy.1999.0089     Document Type: Article

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