High bids and broke winners

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 100, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 129-171

  Zheng, Charles Z ^a  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Auction; Budget; C block auction; Default; FCC; PCS; Spectrum auction

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035180669     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2000.2715     Document Type: Article

References (29)

1. Trouble on the C block
2. Deficit reduction through diversity: How affirmative action at the FCC increased auction competition
3. Multiple-object auctions with budget constrained bidders
4. Telebras buyers need new deal for loan
5. The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget-constrained buyer
6. Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints
7. Financial constraints in auctions: Effects and antidotes
8. Standard auctions with financially constrained bidders
9. FCC raises $412.8 million in wireless sale
10. Can affirmative action be cost effective? an experimental examination of price-preference auctions
11. One FCC auction down; are more coming soon?
12. The winner's curse and public information in common value auctions: Comment
13. Into thin air; the FCC's spectrum auctions prove failures
14. Withdrawable bids as winner's curse insurance
15. The winner's curse and public information in common value auctions: Reply
16. Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers
17. Metro PCS combs market for financing
18. Introduction
19. Brazil's Telebras sell-off is a ringing success
20. Perfect equilibria in budget-constrained sequential auctions: An experimental study
21. Learning from the PCS auctions
22. Is subsidizing inefficient bidders actually costly?
23. Seller financing of consumer durables
24. Auction survival guide
25. Kennard seeks bankruptcy legislation
26. A model of auction contracts with liquidated damages
27. FCC bankruptcy battles continue in court, on hill