The political economy of inflation, labour market distortions and central bank independence

Economic Journal

Volumn 113, Issue 484, 2003, Pages 43-64

  Herrendorf, Berthold ^a   Neumann, Manfred J M ^b  

^a UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III DE MADRID   (Spain)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CENTRAL BANK; INFLATION; LABOR MARKET; POLITICAL ECONOMY;

EID: 0037246481     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0297.00088     Document Type: Article

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