Inflation targets and contracts with uncertain central banker preferences

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking

Volumn 30, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 384-403

  Beetsma, Roel M W J ^a   Jensen, Henrik ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0039658575     PISSN: 00222879     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2601107     Document Type: Article

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