Optimal inflation contracts and inflation targets with uncertain central bank preferences: Accountability through independence?

Economic Journal

Volumn 108, Issue 447, 1998, Pages 529-542

  Muscatelli, Anton ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000951066     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0297.00302     Document Type: Article

References (31)

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