Rogoff's "conservative" central banker restored

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking

Volumn 29, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 476-495

  Herrendorf, Berthold ^a   Lockwood, Ben ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0039712613     PISSN: 00222879     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2953709     Document Type: Article

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