Central bank independence: A sensitivity analysis

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 14, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 73-88

  Eijffinger, Sylvester ^a,b,c   Schaling, Eric ^d   Hoeberichts, Marco ^c  

^a College of Europe   (Belgium)

^b HUMBOLDT UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

^c TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^d BANK OF ENGLAND   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Central bank independence; Inflation; Output growth

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031993341     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0176-2680(97)00040-2     Document Type: Article

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