Policy boards and policy smoothing

Quarterly Journal of Economics

Volumn 115, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 305-339

  Waller, Christopher J ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038811644     PISSN: 00335533     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/003355300554665     Document Type: Article

References (23)

1. Alesina, Alberto, "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game," Quarterly Journal of Economics, CII (1987), 651-678.
2. _, "Credibility and Party Convergence in a Two-Party System with Rational Voters," American Economic Review, LXXVIII (September 1988), 796-805.
3. Alesina, Alberto, and Roberta Gatti, "Independent Central Banks: Low Inflation at No Cost?" American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, LXXXV (May 1995), 196-200.
4. Alesina, Alberto, and Howard Rosenthal, Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
5. Alesina, Alberto, and Howard Rosenthal, "A Theory of Divided Government," Econometrica, LXIV (1996), 1311-1342.
6. Blinder, Alan, Central Banking in Theory and Practice (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998).
7. Bullard, James, and Christopher Waller, "Central Bank in General Equilibrium," Working paper, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 1998.
8. Chang, Kelly, "Their People = Their Policy: The President, Congress and Appointments to the Federal Reserve," Working paper, Department of Political Science, Stanford University, 1997.
9. Cothren, Richard, "Equilibrium Inflation as Determined by a Policy Committee," Quarterly Journal of Economics, CIII (1988), 429-434.
10. Cukierman, Alex, and Allan H. Meltzer, "A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, LIV (1986), 1099-1128.
11. Faust, Jon, "Whom Can We Trust to Run the Fed: Theoretical Support for the Founders' Views," Journal of Monetary Economics, XXXVII (1996), 267-284.
12. Faust, Jon, and John Irons, "Money, Politics and the Post-War Business Cycle," Journal of Monetary Economics, XLIII (1999), 61-90.
13. Garcia de Paso, Jose I., "Institutional Setups of Monetary Policy in a Partisan Economy: An Assessment," Working paper, CEMFI, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 1995.
14. Lexington Herald-Leader, "Chief Justice Criticizes Congress over Court Problems," 1/1/99, A4.
15. Lohmann, Susanne, "Partisan Control of the Money Supply and Decentralized Appointment Powers," European Journal of Political Economy, XIII (1997), 225-246.
16. Schmidt, David, and Christopher Waller, "Risk Aversion in Stochastic Bargaining Games," Working paper, Department of Economics, Indiana University, 1998.
17. Snyder, Susan, and Barry Weingast, "The American System of Shared Powers: The President, Congress, and the NLRB," Working paper, Department of Political Science, Stanford University, 1994.
18. Svensson, Lars E. O., "The Swedish Experience of an Inflation Target," NBER Working Paper No. 4985, 1995.
19. Tabellini, Guido, "Reputational Constraints on Monetary Policy: A Comment," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series of Public Policy, XXVI (1987), 183-190.
20. von Hagen, Jurgen, "Reciprocity and Inflation," in Positive Political Economy, Sylvester Eijffinger and Harry Huizinga, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
21. Waller, Christopher J., "Monetary Policy Games and Central Bank Politics," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, XXI (1989), 422-432.
22. _, "A Bargaining Model of Partisan Appointments to the Central Bank," Journal of Monetary Economics, XXIX (1992), 411-428.
23. Waller, Christopher J., and Carl E. Walsh, "Central Bank Independence, Economic Behavior and Optimal Term Lengths," American Economic Review, LXXXVI (1996), 1139-1153.