Central bank independence, centralization of wage bargaining, inflation and unemployment: Theory and some evidence

European Economic Review

Volumn 43, Issue 7, 1999, Pages 1395-1434

  Cukierman, Alex ^a,b   Lippi, Francesco ^c  

^a TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^b TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^c Research Department   (Italy)

Author keywords

Centralization of wage bargaining; Credibility; Industrial organization of labor markets; Inflation; Monetary institutions; Unemployment

Indexed keywords

BARGAINING; INFLATION; UNEMPLOYMENT; WAGE DETERMINATION;

EID: 0032812883     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00128-7     Document Type: Article

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