The case for a populist central banker

European Economic Review

Volumn 43, Issue 7, 1999, Pages 1317-1344

  Guzzo, Vincenzo ^a   Velasco, Andrés ^a,b  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

Author keywords

Central bank conservatism; Centralization of wage setting; Credibility; Inflation; Unemployment

Indexed keywords

BANKING; UNEMPLOYMENT; WAGE DETERMINATION;

EID: 0032796784     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00127-5     Document Type: Article

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