Auction Theory

Auction Theory

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages

  Krishna, Vijay ^a  

^a PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85014299450     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1016/C2009-0-22474-3     Document Type: Book

References (136)

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