Bidder collusion

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 133, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 374-402

  Marshall, Robert C ^a   Marx, Leslie M ^b  

^a PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Auction; Bidding ring; Cartel; Shill

Indexed keywords

EID: 33847060978     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.12.004     Document Type: Article

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