Ranking sealed high-bid and open asymmetric auctions

Journal of Mathematical Economics

Volumn 42, Issue 4-5 SPEC. ISS., 2006, Pages 471-498

  Cheng, Harrison ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Linear bidding model; Lumber auctions; Open and sealed bid auctions; Revenue ranking

Indexed keywords

EID: 33747791669     PISSN: 03044068     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2006.05.008     Document Type: Article

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