Inefficient ex-post equilibria in efficient auctions

Economic Theory

Volumn 22, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 675-683

  Birulin, Oleksii ^a  

^a PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Auction; Efficiency; Ex post equilibrium; VCG mechnism

Indexed keywords

EID: 0242389838     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-002-0317-4     Document Type: Article

References (11)

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