Asymmetric English auctions

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 112, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 261-288

  Krishna, Vijay ^a  

^a PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Auctions; Efficiency

Indexed keywords

EID: 0142246434     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00074-7     Document Type: Article

References (19)

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