Allocating multiple units

Economic Theory

Volumn 20, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 733-750

  Krishna, Kala ^a,b   Tranæ, Torben ^c  

^a PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN   (Denmark)

Author keywords

First price vs. second price auctions; Menu auctions; Multiple unit auctions; Revenue equivalence

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036031677     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-001-0251-x     Document Type: Article

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