First price auctions with resale

Economics Letters

Volumn 64, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 181-185

  Gupta, Madhurima ^a   Lebrun, Bernard ^b  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITÉ LAVAL   (Canada)

Author keywords

Asymmetry; D44; First price auction; Resale

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033463437     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0165-1765(99)00063-4     Document Type: Article

References (13)

1. Bose, S., Deltas, G., 1998a. A Sealed-bid Auction with Consumers and Middlemen. Mimeo. University of Illinois.
2. Bose, S., Deltas, G., 1998b. Auctions with Probabilistically Participating Re-sellers and Final Consumers. Mimeo. University of Illinois.
3. Gupta, M., Lebrun, B., 1998. A Simple Model of First Price Auction with Resale. Les Cahiers de Recherches du GREEN (working paper series) #98-08.
4. Haile, P.A., 1996. Auctions with Resale. Mimeo. University of Wisconsin-Madison.
5. Haile, P.A., 1997. Auctions with Private Uncertainty and Resale Opportunities. Mimeo. University of Wisconsin-Madison.
6. Lebrun B. First Price Auctions in the Asymmetric N Bidder Case. International Economic Review. 40:(1):1999;125-142.
7. Lebrun, B., 1997b. First Price Auctions in the Asymmetric N Bidder Case. Les Cahiers de Recherches du GREEN (working paper series) #97-03.
8. Maskin, E., Riley, J., 1996a. Uniqueness in Sealed High Bid Auctions. Mimeo (revised version of UCLA Working Paper #407).
9. Maskin, E., Riley, J., 1996b. Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions. Mimeo (revised version of UCLA Working Paper #407).
10. Maskin, E., Riley, J., 1998. Asymmetric Auctions. Mimeo (revised version of UCLA Working Paper #254).
11. McAfee R.P., Vincent D., Williams M.A., Havens M.W. Collusive bidding in hostile takeovers. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy. 2:1993;449-482.
12. Myerson R.B. Optimal auction design. Mathematics of Operations Research. 6:(1):1981;58-63.
13. Riley J.G., Samuelson W.F. Optimal auctions. American Economic Review. 71:1981;381-392.