Optimal reservation prices in auctions

Economic Journal

Volumn 106, Issue 438, 1996, Pages 1271-1283

  Levin, Dan ^a   Smith, James L ^a  

^a OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0012683171     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2235520     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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6. Although Ashenfelter (1989) finds that observed 'buy-in' rates (the percentage of items remaining unsold) remain high for some types of objects despite a large number of bidders, such outcomes are not inconsistent with the implications of our model. In practice, and especially when the item to be auctioned has important components of private value, the seller's true value may itself be high enough to preclude trade.
7. Gribbin, J. A. (1983). 'Procedures for OCS bid adequacy, including the final report of the OCS fair market value task force.' Assistant Secretary for Energy and Minerals, U.S. Department of Interior, March.
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