When Does Informal Enforcement Work?

Journal of Conflict Resolution

Volumn 60, Issue 7, 2016, Pages 1312-1340

  Aakre, Stine ^a   Helland, Leif ^b   Hovi, Jon ^a,c  

^a CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH OSLO CICERO   (Norway)

^b BI NORWEGIAN BUSINESS SCHOOL   (Norway)

^c UNIVERSITY OF OSLO   (Norway)

Author keywords

game theory; international cooperation; international institutions; international regimes; international treaties

Indexed keywords

EID: 84984849223     PISSN: 00220027     EISSN: 15528766     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0022002714560349     Document Type: Article

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