The enforcement-exploitation trade-off in international cooperation between weak and powerful states

European Journal of International Relations

Volumn 17, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 631-653

  Urpelainen, Johannes ^a  

^a Columbia University ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

compliance; game theory; international cooperation; international institutions; power asymmetry

Indexed keywords

EID: 82255182423     PISSN: 13540661     EISSN: 14603713     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1354066110368144     Document Type: Article

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