International institutions and national policies

Cambridge University Press

Volumn 9780521874045, Issue , 2007, Pages 1-187

  Dai, Xinyuan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84929726175     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511491320     Document Type: Book

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