Differentially private and strategy-proof spectrum auction with approximate revenue maximization

Proceedings - IEEE INFOCOM

Volumn 26, Issue , 2015, Pages 918-926

  Zhu, Ruihao ^a   Shin, Kang G ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPLEX NETWORKS; DATA PRIVACY;

ALLOCATION ALGORITHM; AUCTION MECHANISMS; EXPECTED REVENUE; PRIVACY PRESERVING; REVENUE MAXIMIZATION; SPECTRUM AUCTIONS; STRATEGY-PROOFNESS; VICKREY-CLARKE-GROVES AUCTIONS;

PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS;

EID: 84954521927     PISSN: 0743166X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/INFOCOM.2015.7218463     Document Type: Conference Paper

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