Truthful mechanisms for one-parameter agents

Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science - Proceedings

Volumn , Issue , 2001, Pages 482-491

  Archer, A ^a   Tardos, E ^a  

^a Cornell University ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; APPROXIMATION THEORY; COMBINATORIAL MATHEMATICS; COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; POLYNOMIALS; SECURITY OF DATA;

ONE-PARAMETER AGENTS;

INTELLIGENT AGENTS;

EID: 0035176099     PISSN: 02725428     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/sfcs.2001.959924     Document Type: Conference Paper

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