Truthful mechanisms for agents that value privacy

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2013, Pages 215-232

  Chen, Yiling ^a   Chong, Stephen ^a   Kash, Ian A ^b   Moran, Tal ^c   Vadhan, Salil ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b MSR   (United Kingdom)

^c INTERDISCIPLINARY CENTER   (Israel)

Author keywords

Differential privacy; Mechanism design; Privacy

Indexed keywords

DATA PRIVACY; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; MACHINE DESIGN;

DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACIES; ECONOMIC MECHANISMS; FACILITY LOCATION PROBLEM; MECHANISM DESIGN; SOCIAL CHOICE PROBLEMS; SOCIAL WELFARE; TRUTHFUL MECHANISMS; UTILITY FUNCTIONS;

DECISION THEORY;

EID: 84879756092     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/2492002.2482549     Document Type: Conference Paper

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