Competitive auctions and digital goods

Proceedings of the Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms

Volumn , Issue , 2001, Pages 735-744

  Goldberg, Andrew V ^a   Hartline, Jason D ^b   Wright, Andrew ^a  

^a Intertrust Technologies Corporation   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON   (United States)

Author keywords

Algorithms; Management; Measurement; Performance; Theory; Verification

Indexed keywords

EID: 0006670762     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (18)

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