Privacy-aware mechanism design

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages 774-789

  Nissim, Kobbi ^a   Orlandi, Claudio ^b   Smorodinsky, Rann ^c  

^a BEN GURION UNIVERSITY OF THE NEGEV   (Israel)

^b BAR ILAN UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^c TECHNION ISRAEL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (Israel)

Author keywords

differential privacy; mechanism design; privacy

Indexed keywords

DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACIES; DIGITAL GOODS; E-PRINTS; GENERIC CONSTRUCTION; INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY; INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE; MECHANISM DESIGN; NEW MODEL; SELF-INTERESTED AGENTS; UPPER BOUND;

DATA PRIVACY; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE;

MACHINE DESIGN;

EID: 84863503074     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/2229012.2229073     Document Type: Conference Paper

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