Revenue generation for truthful spectrum auction in dynamic spectrum access

Proceedings of the International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing (MobiHoc)

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 3-12

  Jia, Juncheng ^a   Zhang, Qian ^a   Zhang, Qin ^a   Liu, Mingyan ^b  

^a HONG KONG UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY   (Hong Kong)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

Mechanism design; Spectrum auctions

Indexed keywords

COMMERCE; DYNAMICS; MACHINE DESIGN; POLYNOMIAL APPROXIMATION; RADIO COMMUNICATION; SPECTROSCOPY;

DYNAMIC SPECTRUM ACCESS; MECHANISM DESIGN; POLYNOMIAL TIME COMPLEXITY; SECONDARY SPECTRUMS; SPECTRUM AUCTIONS; SPECTRUM UTILIZATION; VICKREY-CLARKE-GROVES; WIRELESS SERVICE PROVIDERS;

MOBILE AD HOC NETWORKS;

EID: 70450159053     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1530748.1530751     Document Type: Conference Paper

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