The exponential mechanism for social welfare: Private, truthful, and nearly optimal

Proceedings - Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages 140-149

  Huang, Zhiyi ^a   Kannan, Sampath ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

differential privacy; exponential mechanism; mechanism design

Indexed keywords

DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACIES; GENERAL TOOLS; MECHANISM DESIGN; SOCIAL WELFARE; TRUTHFUL MECHANISMS; VCG MECHANISM;

COMPUTER SCIENCE;

MACHINE DESIGN;

EID: 84871966152     PISSN: 02725428     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/FOCS.2012.36     Document Type: Conference Paper

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