eBay in the Sky: Strategy-proof wireless spectrum auctions

Proceedings of the Annual International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking, MOBICOM

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 2-13

  Zhou, Xia ^a   Gandhi, Sorabh ^a   Suri, Subhash ^a   Zheng, Haitao ^a  

^a University of California   (United States)

Author keywords

Mechanism design; Spectrum auctions

Indexed keywords

DYNAMIC SPECTRUM; MARKET MANIPULATIONS; MECHANISM DESIGN; MULTIPLE MARKETS; POLYNOMIAL COMPLEXITY; SIMULATION RESULTS; SPECTRUM AUCTIONS; SPECTRUM BANDS; SPECTRUM UTILIZATIONS;

AVAILABILITY; COMMERCE; DESIGN; INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS; MARKETING; MOBILE COMPUTING; WIRELESS NETWORKS;

MACHINE DESIGN;

EID: 60149101747     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1409944.1409947     Document Type: Conference Paper

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