Truthful spectrum auctions with approximate revenue

Proceedings - IEEE INFOCOM

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 2813-2821

  Al Ayyoub, Mahmoud ^a   Gupta, Himanshu ^a  

^a STONY BROOK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

AUCTION MECHANISMS; AUCTION-BASED MARKET; CELLULAR NETWORK; DYNAMIC SPECTRUM ACCESS; EFFICIENT AUCTION; EXPECTED REVENUE; GENERAL INTERFERENCES; KEY OBJECTIVE; PERFORMANCE GUARANTEES; POLYNOMIAL-TIME; RECENT TRENDS; REVENUE MAXIMIZATION; SPECTRUM ACCESS; SPECTRUM AUCTIONS; TEMPORAL DIMENSIONS;

CELLULAR NEURAL NETWORKS; DYNAMICS; SPECTROSCOPY;

COMMERCE;

EID: 79960857311     PISSN: 0743166X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/INFCOM.2011.5935115     Document Type: Conference Paper

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