Equilibrium selection in bargaining models

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 45, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 296-328

  Binmore, Ken ^a   Samuelson, Larry ^b   Young, Peyton ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

^c JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Best response; Contract game; Equilibrium selection; Evolutionary dynamics; Nash demand game; Risk dominance; Stochastic stability

Indexed keywords

EID: 0242570480     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00146-5     Document Type: Article

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