Evolutionary considerations in the framing of social norms

Politics, Philosophy and Economics

Volumn 9, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 265-273

  Skyrms, Brian ^a,b   Zollman, Kevin J S ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Evolutionary game theory; Framing effects; Hawk Dove game; Nash bargaining game; Replicator dynamics; Ultimatum game

Indexed keywords

EID: 77955892223     PISSN: 1470594X     EISSN: 17413060     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1470594X09339744     Document Type: Article

References (18)

1. C. Bicchieri, The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
2. D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (Mineola, NY: Dover, 2003 [1739-40]), p. 348.
3. For a detailed study of evolutionary dynamics in the ultimatum game, see K. Binmore, J. Gale and L. Samuelson, 'Learning to be Imperfect: The Ultimatum Game', Games and Economic Behavior 8 (1995): 56-90
4. W. Harms, 'Evolution and Ultimatum Bargaining', Theory and Decision 42 (1997): 147-75.
5. Binmore et al., 'Learning to be Imperfect', p. 59
6. See also B. Skyrms, Evolution of the Social Contract (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
7. K.J.S. Zollman, 'Explaining Fairness in Complex Environments', Politics, Philosophy and Economics 7 (2008): 81-97.
8. Ibid., p. 89.
9. The study by Costa-Gomes et al. referred to in the quote is M. Costa-Gomes, V.P. Crawford and B. Broseta, 'Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study', Econometica 5 (2001): 1193-235.
10. F. Mengel, 'Learning Across Games', IVIE Working Paper AD 2007-05, URL (2008): http://merlin.fae.ua.es/friederike/Dateien/LAGjan09.pdf.
11. J. Mehta, C. Starmer and R. Sugden, 'An Experimental Investigation of Focal Points in Coordination and Bargaining: Some Preliminary Results', in Decision Making Under Risk and Uncertainty: New Models and Findings, edited by J. Geweke (Norwell: Kluwer, 1992).
12. John Maynard Smith, Evolution and the Theory of Games (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
13. R. Aumann, 'Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies', Journal of Mathematical Economics 1 (1974): 67-96.
14. Skyrms, Evolution of the Social Contract, Figure 3. See Figure 2 in the present article.
15. For a similar observation in a spatial model, see R. Axtell, J. Epstein and H.P. Young, 'The Emergence of Classes in a Multi-Agent Bargaining Model', in Social Dynamics, edited by S. Durlauf and H.P. Young (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
16. J.B. Van Huyck, R.C. Battalio and F.W. Rankin, 'On the Origin of Convention: Evidence from Coordination Games', Economic Journal 107 (1997): 576-96.
17. F.W. Rankin, J.B. Van Huyck and R.C. Battalio, 'Strategic Similarity and Emergent Conventions: Evidence from Similar Stag Hunt Games', Games and Economic Behavior 32 (2000): 315-37.
18. J. Henrich, R. Boyd, R. Bowles, C. Camerer, E. Fehr and H. Gintis, Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-Scale Societies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).