Inventing New Signals

Dynamic Games and Applications

Volumn 2, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 129-145

  McKenzie Alexander, Jason ^a   Skyrms, Brian ^b,c   Zabell, Sandy L ^d  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^c STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^d NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Chinese Restaurant Process; Hoppe P lya urn; Invention; Reinforcement; Signals

Indexed keywords

EID: 84869221283     PISSN: 21530785     EISSN: 21530793     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s13235-011-0027-2     Document Type: Article

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