Economic theories of family firms

The Sage Handbook of Family Business

Volumn , Issue , 2014, Pages 100-118

  Shukla, Prashant P ^a   Carney, Michael ^b   Gedajlovic, Eric ^a  

^a SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^b Dept of Electrical and Computer Engineering   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84940785559     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4135/9781446247556.n6     Document Type: Chapter

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