Interorganizational familiness: How family firms use interlocking directorates to build community-level social capital

Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice

Volumn 30, Issue 6, 2006, Pages 755-775

  Lester, Richard H ^a   Cannella, Albert A ^b  

^a TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33750618791     PISSN: 10422587     EISSN: 15406520     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6520.2006.00149.x     Document Type: Article

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