An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design

An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design

Volumn , Issue , 2015, Pages 1-264

  Börgers, Tilman ^a   Krähmer, Daniel ^b   Strausz, Roland ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

^c HUMBOLDT UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

Auctions; Incentives; Information; Mechanism design; Public goods; Voting

Indexed keywords

EID: 84938809059     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199734023.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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