Robust mechanism design

Econometrica

Volumn 73, Issue 6, 2005, Pages 1771-1813

  Bergemann, Dirk ^a   Morris, Stephen ^b  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Common knowledge; Dominant strategies; Ex post equilibrium; Interim equilibrium; Mechanism design; Universal type space

Indexed keywords

EID: 33646353265     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: 14680262     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00638.x     Document Type: Article

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