An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism

Econometrica

Volumn 81, Issue 6, 2013, Pages 2463-2485

  Athey, Susan ^a   Segal, Ilya ^b  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Budget balance; Dynamic incentive compatibility; Dynamic mechanism design; Folk theorems with private; Markov games with private information; Perfect Bayesian equilibrium

Indexed keywords

EID: 84887539309     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: 14680262     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3982/ECTA6995     Document Type: Article

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