Multidimensional mechanism design: Revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 137, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 153-185

  Manelli, Alejandro M ^a   Vincent, Daniel R ^b  

^a ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

Author keywords

Adverse selection; Extreme point; Faces; Incentive compatibility; Mechanism design; Monopoly pricing; Multidimensional screening; Non linear pricing

Indexed keywords

EID: 36048950791     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.12.007     Document Type: Article

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