Some chance for consensus: Voting methods for which consensus is an equilibrium

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 38, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 43-57

  Heitzig, Jobst ^a   Simmons, Forest W ^b  

^a POTSDAM INSTITUTE FOR CLIMATE IMPACT RESEARCH   (Germany)

^b Liberal Arts and Mathematics Division   (United States)

Author keywords

Benchmark; Consensus decision making; Fall back method; Lottery; Random ballot; Strong correlated equilibrium; Voting method

Indexed keywords

EID: 82955189137     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-010-0517-y     Document Type: Article

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