Weak monotonicity characterizes deterministic dominant-strategy implementation

Econometrica

Volumn 74, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 1109-1132

  Bikhchandani, Sushil ^a   Chatterji, Shurojit ^b   Lavi, Ron ^c   Mu'alem, Ahuva ^d   Nisan, Noam ^e   Sen, Arunava ^f  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b INSTITUTO TECNOLÓGICO AUTÓNOMO DE MÉXICO   (Mexico)

^c CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^d BAR ILAN UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^e HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

^f INDIAN STATISTICAL INSTITUTE   (India)

Author keywords

Dominant strategy implementation; Multi object auctions

Indexed keywords

EID: 33745297534     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: 14680262     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00695.x     Document Type: Review

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