The price of advice

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 38, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 863-880

  Eso, Péter ^a   Szentes, Balázs ^b  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 41749118326     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0741-6261.2007.00116.x     Document Type: Article

References (21)

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