Foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 74, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 447-476

  Chung, Kim Sau ^a   Ely, J C ^a  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

GAME THEORY; KNOWLEDGE; OPTIMIZATION;

EID: 33947700852     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: 1467937X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2007.00427.x     Document Type: Article

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